高管薪酬差距、管理层权力与公司业绩波动——基于中小板上市公司的实证研究  

Executive Compensation Gap,Managerial Power and Fluctuations of Firm's Performance——Empirical Evidence from China's Small and Medium Enterprise Board Listed Companies

作　　者：刘美玉[1] 王帅[1] 南晖 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学工商管理学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《预测》2015年第1期48-53,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71002093);国家社会科学基金资助项目(11BGL045)

摘　　要：公司治理机制有效与否，不仅体现在公司价值和业绩水平上，还体现在公司业绩的波动性上。管理层内部实行差别化的薪酬体系，被认为是解决代理问题的有效途径，薪酬差距越大，高管团队内的竞争越激烈，为了在业绩竞赛中打败对手，高管会竞相做出更高风险的决策，从而加大公司业绩的波动程度。本文选取2009-2011年中小板上市公司为研究样本，考察高管薪酬差距与公司业绩波动的关系，并探索管理层权力对该作用过程的影响机制。研究发现，随着高管薪酬差距的加大，公司业绩的波动性更大，风险也随之提高，在两职合一、股权分散的上市公司中，高管薪酬差距对公司业绩波动的影响更大，而高管长期在位的影响并不显著。Both the performance and fluctuations of a company can be used to check whether the governance mechanism of a corporate is effective or not. Most researchers consider that a differential compensation system is an effective way to solve the agency problem on the management. The greater compensation gap among executive is, the fiercer competition of the senior management team will be. Meanwhile, executives make higher risky decisions to defeat his opponents in the competition and this will increase the volatility of firm’ s performance. In this paper, we examine this relationship by selecting the data of Small and Medium Enterprise Board listed companies from 2009 to 2011 as samples and explore the mechanism of the influencing process of managerial power. We find that the fluctuations of firm’ s performance become greater with the increasing of compensation gap among executive, and it leads the company ’ s management risk to increasing. The research findings also indicate that the influence about compensation gap among executive affects the volatility of firm’ s performance, especially in companies which seat their CEO in board chair or have a diffuse ownership of the company. However, this influence is not significant if executives are sitting for a long time.

关 键 词：高管薪酬差距 管理层权力 公司业绩波动 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]