具有涉他偏好的地方官员晋升锦标激励研究  

An Analysis of Promotion Tournament Incentive of China's Local Officials under Other- Regarding Preference

作　　者：张晶[1] 韩李利 梁巧转[1] 唐梦媛 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]河南中烟工业有限责任公司,河南郑州450000

出　　处：《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第1期54-60,共7页Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC840005);国家自然科学基金(71071128);国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AZD110);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2011jdgz08)

摘　　要：将行为人涉他偏好(嫉妒和自豪)因素引入地方官员政治晋升博弈模型中,考察了其对地方官员行为的影响。结果显示:涉他偏好对地方官员产生了更高的先验激励,在加剧同级官员之间竞争、促使地方官员付出更多努力的同时,还改变了社会福利水平和地方官员对区域合作抑或分割的行为选择;处于竞争劣势的官员会在维持发展型努力的同时采取"攫取之手"并提高其保留效用;地方官员在合作时倾向于同所辖区域发展水平相差较大的区域,而非发展水平相近的区域。In this paper,by introducing assumption of agent′s other -regarding preference from organization and psycho-logical game experiment,a simple model of political promotion game is presented in order to investigate the effects of en-vy and egoistic psychological factors on officials behavior.It turns out that officials exert higher efforts than other -re-garding preference officials.Contrary to previous promotion models,ex ant incentives from other -regarding preference promote the level of social welfare and the officials choice of corporation or fragmentation.When Officials at a competi-tive disadvantage maintain developmental efforts,they will take measures like ＆quot;grabbing a hand＆quot;to improve their reser-vation utility;Besides,local officials tend to cooperate with the areas which are comparatively different at regional devel-opment level,rather than at a similar level of development area.

关 键 词：政治晋升 锦标赛模型 涉他偏好 区域合作与分割 

分 类 号：C933.42[经济管理—管理学]