可被经验挫败的先验辩护  

A Priori Knowledge is Empirically Revisable

作　　者：李楠[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学人文与社会科学学部人文学院,辽宁大连116023

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2015年第1期47-51,共5页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：第55批中国博士后科学基金面上资助"关于现象意识的强表征主义研究"(项目编号:2014M551100)

摘　　要：先验知识常常被赋予各种独特的性质,其中引发争论的一个特性是不可被后验经验挫败。通过概念上的区分和思想实验构造的例子,以卡素罗为代表的一批哲学家反对先验辩护的信念不可被经验推翻,虽然他们的结论是正确的,但例子并不成功。通过提出共同辩护的概念,文章最后给出了一个成功说明先验辩护被后验挫败的例子。A priori .knowledge is often attributed to many unique features, one of which is the unrevisability by the experience. Philosophers like Casullo object to the doctrine that a priori knowledge is not revisable when confronted with unfavorable empirical evidence by clarifying concepts and offering counterexamples from thought experiment. Although their conclusion is correct, the counterexamples they gave are not proper. By raising the concept of＂co-justification＂, the author gives a successful example at the end of the paper to illustrate that a priori justification could be defeated by a posteriori experience.

关 键 词：先验 知识 辩护 后验 挫败 

分 类 号：X921[环境科学与工程—安全科学]