多地区助学贷款管理中员工的激励机制  

Incentive mechanisms on staff in multi-area student-origin credit loan management

作　　者：丁立波[1,2] 万生彩[2] 谢乃明[1] 李帮义[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]济南大学学生工作处,山东济南250022

出　　处：《济南大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第2期112-119,共8页Journal of University of Jinan(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71171113);山东省教育厅科研计划(J13WH119)

摘　　要：生源地信用助学贷款管理中,银行委托各县级资助中心负责本地区贷款管理并基于贷款业绩对员工实施激励。员工业绩由努力水平、银行评价及不同地区环境差异等因素决定。银行对员工业绩评价的主观性以及不兑现奖励承诺的道德风险弱化了对员工的激励,从而影响生源地助学贷款政策顺利实施。将锦标机制应用于银行道德风险防范和基于业绩的员工激励机制,研究表明:相对业绩排序法排除了共同不确定因素对员工业绩的影响;规定业绩指标合约中,银行的占优选择是兑现承诺并将较高报酬按照合理的员工比例支付给业绩较高的员工。研究建议:激励机制设计应依据员工努力水平而非绝对业绩,银行只需为具有公务人身份的员工支付固定工资之外的奖励,银行和政府联手实施惩罚同样会对员工产生激励。In student-origin credit loans,banks entrust county-level financial assistance centers to manage and encourage their staff according to their achievement,which is decided on staff effort,bank evaluation and common uncertainty factors. However,the evaluation subjectivity and the bank moral hazard of not fulfilling incentive promises weaken the incentive intensity and hinder the loan policy running smoothly. Tournament theory is an incentive mechanism that studies principal-agent problems based on participant＇s performance rank order. Study shows that relative performance ranking method can eliminate the influence of common uncertainty factors on staff＇s performance,and in the specified performance index contract,bank＇s dominant strategy is promising to pay higher reward for higher performance according to a reasonable proportion. The studies suggest that the design of incentive mechanism should be based on the employee＇s effort rather than the absolute performance,and the bank should only pay the reward except for fixed salary because the staff are government emplyee. Punishment given by bank together with government would also have the incentive effect to staff.

关 键 词：县级资助中心员工 银行道德风险 锦标机制 激励机制 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] D630.3[政治法律—政治学]