终极控制权对高管薪酬激励效应影响的实证分析  

A Empirical Study of Ultimate Control Rights Influencing Incentives of Executive Compensation

作　　者：孙永生[1] 陈维政[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安工程大学,西安710048 [2]四川大学,成都610064

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2015年第4期20-26,共7页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(项目编号:13YJA630080);陕西省普通高校哲学社会科学特色学科建设项目"陕西纺织经济管理研究中心";陕西高校哲学社会科学重点研究基地"纺织经济与管理研究中心"基金;陕教位[2009]6号;西安工程大学博士科研启动基金项目

摘　　要：本文基于中国A股市场上市公司样本数据,从高管人力资本产权实现的理论视角,考虑终极控制权情景因素,实证分析了高管股权激励的结果效应。结论显示,终极控制权影响高管薪酬激励方式的选择,高管薪酬激励方式影响企业绩效,具体控制权情景下高管薪酬激励方式间企业绩效存在差异。总体而言,不论国有性质还是非国有性质,低控制权强度下实施股权激励的企业绩效显著高于未实施股权激励的企业,而高控制权强度下二者的差异不显著。Based on the panel data of the listed companies in China＇s Stock Market , from the theoretical perspective of human capi-tal property rights realization , and consider the ultimate control rights , this paper empirically analyzes the effect of equity incentive for the managers . The study shows that the ultimate control rights affect the choice of executive compensation ways , the latter affects the firm per-formance , and under different control rights there are differences in firm performance between ways of executive compensation . In general , state-owned or non-state-owned company , the firm performance in equity-based incentive enterprises is better than that in no equity enterprises under low control rights , but firm performance has no significant difference between equity and no equity enterprises under high control rights .

关 键 词：终极控制权 高管薪酬激励方式 股权激励 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]