关于中国上市公司经营者持股情况的研究  

A Research about the CEOs Stock-holding of Chinese Com-pany

作　　者：林晓婉[1] 车宏生[1] 朱敏[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学心理系 [2]北京市社会科学院社会学所

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2002年第4期23-27,44,共6页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：本项研究为福特基金会资助项目成果。

摘　　要：本研究以中国上市公司为抽样总体,从上千家企业中随机抽取315家企业作为样本进行统计分析,对2000年上市公司经营者的持股情况进行总体考察,结果发现,2000年经营者的货币年薪比前两年有了很大程度的提高,但是,股票持有量并没有太大的变化,经营者“零持股”的现象仍然大量存在;从中美企业经营者薪酬结构的比较中可以看出,我国经营者激励形式单一,结构具有不合理性,股票期权等长期激励所占的比例非常小;我国经营者的年薪与持有的股票数量正相关;Logistic回归发现能够显著预测经营者是否获得股票的变量只有净资产收益率和经营者的年龄两个变量。但是,净资产收益率的作用却是反向的。This research aims to discuss the CEOs stock-holding of Chinesecompanies which have come into the market by data-analysis. The resultsare as follows: CEOs annual salary has greatly increased in 2000 comparingwith that in 1998 and 1999.However, there is even no improvement in thequantity of their stocks. Most of CEOs even hold no stock . Chinese incentive-reward system has a single form and an unreasonable structure. The proportionof long-term incentive such as stock option is very small. The correlationbetween CEOs stocks and annual salary is positive. Its only the yield of netasset and age of CEO that can predict whether they have the access to holdstocks, but the contribution of the net asset yield is negative.

关 键 词：中国 上市公司 经营者持股情况 研究 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]