基于孵化网络声誉的科技企业孵化器与初创企业动态合作策略研究  

Business Incubator and Entrepreneur Dynamic Strategies Based on Incubation Network Reputation

作　　者：赵黎明[1] 刘嘉玥 刘猛 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2015年第10期59-64,共6页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70972117)

摘　　要：基于孵化器和初创企业孵化网络,应用微分对策理论,在Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg博弈和协同合作博弈3种情形下,考察孵化器与初创企业为提高孵化网络声誉所付出的最大努力,并对反馈均衡结果进行比较分析。结果表明,双方在协同合作博弈情形下付出了较高努力,且所获收益高于Nash非合作博弈和Stackelberg博弈情形下的收益水平。Based on the incubation network composed of business incubator and entrepreneur, this paper assumes the incubator and entrepreneur strive to improve the reputation of the incubation network to attract risk investment, and we employ the methodology of differential games to investigate the incubator＇s and entrepreneur＇s optimal level of effort in the Nash non-cooperative game,Stackelberg leader-follower game and coordinated cooperative game. And then the feedback equilibrium outcomes in the three game structures are comparatively analyzed. The results show that, both sides in coordinated cooperation game paid a higher level of effort,and the gains are higher than the income of Nash non-cooperative game and Stackelberg leader-follower game.

关 键 词：孵化网络声誉 科技企业孵化器 微分对策 反馈均衡 动态合作 

分 类 号：F272.2[经济管理—企业管理]