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出 处:《科学学与科学技术管理》2015年第6期46-55,共10页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.
基 金:教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(20120032110035);科技部创新方法工作专项(2013IM030100;2012IM040500)
摘 要:知识流失风险普遍存在于企业间知识共享中。以企业的风险态度为视角,将企业知识共享行为分为互惠主义行为和机会主义行为,利用动态博弈论分析了知识共享双方行为的动态演化过程,探讨了知识共享双方的风险态度对双方知识共享行为的影响机理,以及促进双方最终均选择互惠主义行为的措施,最后用一个算例对结论加以说明。研究结果表明:知识共享双方的风险态度对双方的知识共享行为有影响;为选择合适的知识共享对象,企业应综合考虑自身及其他企业的风险态度;为促进知识共享双方最终均选择互惠主义行为,企业应适度提高向机会主义行为方索要的赔偿金。The loss of knowledge is a popular problem in knowledge sharing between enterprises. The risk atti- tude of an enterprise is introduced in this paper. The knowledge sharing behavior of an enterprise is divided into reciprocal behavior and opportunistic behavior. The dynamic game theory is used to analyze the dynamic evolu- tion process of the knowledge sharing behaviors of enterprises. The effects of enterprises' risk attitudes on their knowledge sharing behaviors and measures that can promote both enterprises eventually choose reciprocal behavior are discussed. The conclusions of this paper are further illustrated by numerical simulations. The results show that the risk attitudes of enterprises influence their knowledge sharing behaviors. In order to choose a proper know- ledge sharing object, the risk attitudes of both the enterprise itself and other enterprises should be taken into con- sideration. In order to promote both enterprises eventually choose reciprocal behavior, enterprises should appropria- tely ask for more compensation from the opportunist.
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