基于KMRW模型的企业技术研发联盟稳定性研究  

Research on the Stability of Enterprise Technology R&D Alliance Based on the KMRW Model

作　　者：徐浩[1] 刘宇琴[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学电子商务及供应链系统重庆市重点实验室,重庆400067 [2]重庆工商大学管理学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《科技与经济》2015年第3期71-75,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目--"竞争性战略联盟的稳定性及其治理机制研究"(项目编号:70972143;项目负责人:蔡继荣)成果之一;重庆市科委前沿与应用基础研究项目--"基于系统动力学的制造企业间战略联盟协同机制研究"(项目编号:cstc2014jcyj A00050;项目负责人:蔡继荣)成果之一;重庆市研究生科研创新项目--"企业技术研发联盟系统中的机会主义行为及其防范机制研究"(项目编号:yjscxx2015-41-13;项目负责人:徐浩)成果之一

摘　　要：研发联盟成员之间的契约是不完备的,这种不完备契约很大程度上增加了联盟成员采取机会主义行为的概率,影响合作的稳定性,而信誉机制是保持联盟稳定的重要机制之一。基于KMRW模型分析了贴现因子、合作次数以及加入惩罚因子对于联盟成员是否选择守信、减小机会主义行为的作用机理。研究结论表明,提高贴现因子、合作次数并加入惩罚机制都有利于联盟企业保持信誉,积极参与合作。最后根据结论为研发联盟稳定发展提供一些启示。The contract is incomplete between R＆D alliance members, and this will increase the probability to take opportunism behavior for alliance members. So it has to influence the stability of cooperation. Reputation mechanism is one of the important mecha- nisms to keep the alliance stable. Based on the KMRW model, this article analyzes the important role of the discount factor and number of cooperation to keep reputation mechanism; then, it continues to add the punishment factor, and discusses the mechanism of penalty factor, the discount factor, number of cooperation for alliance members to choose to be trustworthy and cooperate. The conclusion shows that increasing the discount factor, the number of cooperation and taking penalty measures will be helpful for alliance members to keep reputations and cooperation. Finally, this article provides some inspirations for R＆D alliance stability according to the conclusions.

关 键 词：研发联盟 信誉 重复博弈 贴现因子 惩罚因子 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]