基于互惠偏好理论的股东监督与经理管理防御的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Shareholder's Supervision with Manager's Managerial Entrenchment Based on the Theory of Reciprocal Preference

作　　者：李秉祥[1] 郭慧[1] 李越[1] 陶瑞[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710054

出　　处：《软科学》2015年第7期78-82,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272118);陕西省高校重点学科专项资金建设项目(107-00X902)

摘　　要：在高能力经理的假定条件下,通过博弈方法将互惠偏好引入股东监督与经理管理防御的非完全信息博弈赛局中,研究经理互惠偏好对其管理防御水平的影响作用。研究结果表明:当股东对经理采取弱监督策略时,互惠型经理因互惠公平效用的增加而选择较低的管理防御水平;相反,当股东对经理采取强监督策略时,互惠型经理因较小的互惠公平效用而选择相对较高的管理防御水平。Utilizing the game method which introduces the reciprocal preference into the incomplete information game of shareholder＇s supervise strategies with manager＇s managerial entrenchment,this paper researches the influence of manager＇s reciprocal preference to the level of manager＇s managerial entrenchment,on the assumption that the managers is of high ability. Result shows that the reciprocal type manager will select lower level of managerial entrenchment because of the increasing reciprocal fair utility when the shareholder adopts a weak supervision policy. On the contrary,the reciprocal type manager will select relatively higher level of managerial entrenchment because of the smaller reciprocal fair utility when the shareholder adopts a stronger supervision policy.

关 键 词：互惠偏好 股东监督 管理防御 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]