有限的理性与自由的意志——从奥古斯丁和洛克看自由主义的意志论维度  

Restricted Rationality and Free Will——Examining Voluntarism Dimension of Liberalism from Augustine's and Locke's Perspectives

作　　者：李绍猛[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学哲学学院,北京100875

出　　处：《江苏行政学院学报》2015年第5期12-18,共7页The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute

基　　金：北京师范大学自主科研基金新教师项目"罗尔斯的制度主义民主理论:比较政治哲学探索"(SKZZX2013098)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：与通常的理解不同,自由主义既不是建立在性恶论的基础之上,比如阿克顿的名言"权力导致腐败"等,也不需要像密尔那样,将自由当作人类进步的路径假定人性有无限向善的可能性。自由主义的人性论就像基督教神学的人性论一样,是一种基于意志的有限人性论。从基督教神学中的神人关系假设中可以找到这种人性论的根源。自由主义所保护的自由是意志的自由,意志的自由最能体现人的个体性和人与人之间的平等,就此而言,奥古斯丁和洛克的有限人性论有着结构上的相似性。Different from the usual understandings, liberalism is neither built on the doctrine of evil human nature, such as Aeton＇s famous quote, ＂Power lends to corruption＂, nor echoes Mill＇s statement that takes freedom as the paths to human progress and assumes that humanity has unlimited possibilities for goodness. Human nature doctrine in liberalism re- sembles the one in Christian theology, which is a restricted human nature based on the will. From the hypothesis of God- human relationship in Christian theology, we can find the roots of such doctrine of human nature. The freedom protected by liberalism is the free will, which can best reflect people＇s individuality and equality between people. For that matter, Augustine and Locke＇s theories of restricted human nature share structural similarities.

关 键 词：奥古斯丁 自由意志 否定性自由 肯定性自由 有限人性论 

分 类 号：B503.1[哲学宗教—外国哲学]