知识资产与企业绩效:激励和监督机制的不对称性  

Knowledge Assets and Economic Performance:The Asymmetric of Incentives and Monitoring Mechanism

作　　者：杨青[1] 王玉[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经论丛》2015年第9期77-83,共7页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：上海财经大学研究生创新基金资助项目(CXJJ-2013339);上海远程教育集团科研计划资助项目(JF1514)

摘　　要：本文对知识资产与企业的经济绩效之间的关系及知识资产在不同的治理机制下对企业的经济绩效的影响机制进行理论探讨,利用2007-2013年中国信息技术业上市公司的数据进行实证研究,发现知识资产的增加有利于企业的经济绩效的提高,公司治理中的激励和监督机制具有不对称的调节作用,激励机制强化知识资产与企业的经济绩效之间的正向关系,而过强的监督机制将弱化二者之间的关系。Different corporate governance mechanism has an impact on enterprise resource allocation efficiency. This pa- per discusses the relationship between knowledge assets and economic performance and the influence of knowledge assets on e- conomic performance in different governance mechanisms theoretically and then conducts an empirical analysis based on panel data of Chinese IT listed companies. This paper finds several major results. First, knowledge assets is conducive to the im- provement of enterprises＇ economic performance. Second, monitoring and incentive governance mechanisms have asymmetric moderating effects on the relationship between innovative knowledge assets and economic performance. Third incentive mecha- nism will enhance the relationship, while monitoring mechanism will weaken the relationship between the two.

关 键 词：知识资产 激励机制 监督机制 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F124.3[经济管理—世界经济]