考虑知识属性的供应链企业间知识交易契约  

Contract of Knowledge Trading among Members in Supply Chain Considering Knowledge Attribute

作　　者：陈伟[1,2] 杨柏[1,2] 宋寒[3] 

机构地区：[1]四川外国语大学国别经济与国际商务研究中心,重庆400031 [2]四川外国语大学国际商学院,重庆400031 [3]重庆理工大学工商管理学院,重庆400054

出　　处：《技术经济》2015年第9期104-109,共6页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"关系和信任导向下供应链企业间知识共享的创新效应与实现机制研究"(13CGL013);国家自然科学基金项目"知识密集型服务外包中的知识共享激励与知识资产争端协调机制研究"(71301182);重庆市教委科学技术研究项目"合作创新视角下供应链企业间知识共享的治理机制及其实证研究"(KJ131003)

摘　　要：基于供应链合作创新的视角,考虑知识的显性和隐性属性,运用委托-代理理论设计了供应链企业间显性知识和隐性知识交易的多任务激励契约机制。研究表明:如果显性知识和隐性知识的转移成本函数相互独立,那么激励相容条件下两类知识交易的最优业绩报酬也是相互独立的,且最优激励因子是各类交易下知识买方边际收益的增函数、知识卖方绝对风险规避系数、各类知识转移边际成本变化率和业绩方差的减函数,在此基础上提出了效率风险的概念;如果两类知识的转移成本函数相互依存,那么在激励相容条件下隐性知识交易的最优激励契约是"门槛型激励契约",并定量地给出了知识卖方的"门槛激励条件"。Based on the perspective of cooperative innovation in supply chain,considering the explicit and tacit attribute of knowledge,the multitask incentive contract of explicit and tacit knowledge trading is designed with the principal-agent theory. And then the incentive effect of con tract is analyzed. The conclusion indicates as follows： if the cost functions of explicit and tacit knowledge transfer are independent with each other and the incentives are compatible, the optimal performance revenues of two kinds of knowledge trading are independent with each other; the optimal incentive factor is an increasing function of knowledge buyer＇s marginal revenue of each kind of knowledge trading,is a decreasing function of knowledge seller＇s absolute risk aversion coefficient,the marginal cost change rate of each trading and performance variance,then the concept of efficiency risk is introduced;if the cost functions of explicit and tacit knowledge transfer are dependent with each other and the incentives are compatible, the optimal incentive contract in tacit knowledge trading is a ＂threshold-based incentive contract＂, and the ＂threshold-based incentive condition＂ of knowledge seller is presented quantitatively.

关 键 词：供应链 知识交易 知识属性 契约设计 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]