金融关联能否影响民营企业的薪酬契约?  

Does Financial Connection Affect Private Enterprise's Pay Contracts?

作　　者：邓建平[1] 陈爱华[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门国家会计学院,361005

出　　处：《会计研究》2015年第9期52-58,97,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71102054);教育部人文社科基金项目(13YJC630019);福建省社科规划项目(2013B057);财政部"全国会计领军(后备)人才(学术类)培养项目"的资助

摘　　要：本文以2007-2012年我国A股民营上市公司为研究对象,以引入金融关联高管的公司作为金融关联样本,以没有建立金融关联的公司作为配对样本,运用双重差分法(DID)和倾向得分匹配法(PSM)实证研究了金融关联与民营企业薪酬契约的关系。研究发现,相对于配对公司,民营企业引入金融关联高管后其高管的薪酬水平显著提高。同时,金融关联高管的薪酬越高,企业高管整体薪酬水平增幅也越大。研究结论表明,金融关联高管相对高的薪酬参照点是影响我国民营企业高管薪酬增长的重要因素。In this paper,we used private enterprises as study sample during 2007- 2012. We took private firms with financial connections as financial connection samples and took non- financial connection firms as their matched samples,and then applied DID and PSM to have an empirical study on the relationship between financial connections and private firms' pay contracts. It's found that there would be a noticeable increase in executives' payments after those private firms introduced financial connection executives. Meanwhile,the higher payments of these financial connection top executives,the faster growing speed of the whole top executive payments. Our study showed that the bench mark of financial connection executives is an influential factor that affects payment growth of private firms' top- executives.

关 键 词：金融关联 薪酬契约 民营企业 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济]