公平偏好下的团队激励与管理  

Team Incentive and Management under Fairness Preference

作　　者：魏光兴[1] 张舒[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《国土资源科技管理》2015年第5期61-67,共7页Scientific and Technological Management of Land and Resources

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102165)

摘　　要：用行为博弈论方法建立同时考虑工作能力差异和公平偏好强度差异的团队模型,在风险规避条件下分析均衡努力和产出,并比较公平偏好和自利偏好情形的差异。研究发现,公平偏好会降低高能力者的努力水平同时会提高低能力者的努力水平,当员工能力大小比值大于其公平偏好强度比值的倒数时公平偏好能够帕累托改进团队生产,而风险规避一定会降低员工努力水平和团队产出。因此,使员工的工作能力和公平偏好都存在差异有利于提高团队绩效,应该搭档选择公平偏好强度小的高能力者和公平偏好强度大的低能力者,同时尽量选择风险规避度较弱者,组建工作团队。This paper develops a team model incorporating difference of ability and fairness preference in approach of behavioral game theory,and hereby analyzes the efforts and outputs at equilibrium,and furthermore,compares the outcome under fairness and that under self-interest.It is found that the fairness preference can reduce the effort of the agent with high ability while increasing that of low ability,and moreover,when the ratio of ability is bigger than reverse ratio of fairness preference,the fairness can get a Pareto improvement of team production,but the risk aversion always reduce the efforts and outputs.Therefore,it is useful for teamwork to build working team with agents of different abilities and fairness preferences,to choose the agents with weak fairness preference and high ability,and agents with strong fairness preference and low ability to build working team,and try to choose those with low risk aversion.

关 键 词：公平偏好 团队激励 风险规避 比较研究 行为博弈论 

分 类 号：F242[经济管理—劳动经济]