高管薪酬与盈余管理关系实证研究——来自沪深A股市场的经验证据  

An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Executive Compensation and Earnings Management

作　　者：王小宁[1] 朱文浠 

机构地区：[1]三峡大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2015年第10期65-68,82,共5页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：本文以我国2011-2014年A股上市公司为研究样本,利用修正琼斯模型和Roychowdhury的模型,从货币薪酬和持股两个方面实证检验了高管薪酬与应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理的关系。研究结果表明:高管的货币薪酬与应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理均存在显著的负相关关系;高管持股与真实盈余管理显著负相关,与应计盈余管理呈现不显著的正相关关系。This paper selects listed companies of China's A-share market from 2011 to 2014 as samples.and use The Modified Jones Model and Roychowdhury's model to do empirical analysis.We study the relationship between executive compensation and accrual-based and real earnings management through two aspects which are monetary compensation and stock.The results show that executive monetary compensation exhibits obvious inhibition effects to accrual-based and real earnings management.The higher executives' monetary compensation is,the less accrual-based and real earnings management activities they take:meanwhile,executive ownership has a significant negative correlation with real earnings management and inapparent positive correlation with accrual-based earnings management.The results have some enlightenment to improve executive compensation structure of listed companies and to establish reasonable and effective evaluation system of executive compensation.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 高管持股 应计盈余管理 真实盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]