在职消费具有效率吗——来自证券市场的经验证据  

Are Perks Efficient——The Evidence from Stock Market

作　　者：吴成颂[1] 唐伟正 黄送钦[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《贵州财经大学学报》2015年第6期20-34,共15页Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:71302113);国家社科基金重大项目(项目编号:11&ZD011);安徽省高校人文社科研究重大项目(项目编号:SK2014ZD006)

摘　　要：以2008—2013年沪市A股制造业为样本,从控股股东资金侵占和公司业绩的角度探讨了转型期高管在职消费是否具有效率的问题。研究发现,高管在职消费对控股股东资金侵占行为产生了一定的约束效应并与企业绩效显著正相关,即在职消费是有效率的。通过进一步地研究还发现,当高管个人具备政治联系时,会使在职消费在不同产权性质下表现出截然相反的"自利"和"寻租"特征。对于国有控股企业而言,自利型在职消费会损害公司业绩,而对于非国有控股企业而言,寻租型在职消费则会改善企业绩效。以上经验证据表明,在职消费是否具有效率受到高管个人政治联系和企业产权性质的影响,一定程度上扭曲了其本质上作为管理层激励的固有效应。Using the data of China＇ s SH A -share listed companies in manufacturing from 2008 to 2013. From the perspective of tunneling and company performance, this paper discusses whether executive＇ s perks have efficiency during the transition period. The study finds, perks curbs tunneling of controlling shareholders and has a significant positive correlation with company performance, all this means perks are efficient. But the political connections of senior executives will weaken this effect. In addition, the effect of executive perks on company performance is influenced by the nature of property rights. Under the state -owned holding property, and when executives have political connections, perks shows a damaging characteristic to company performance, but under the same conditions, perks will exhibit rent - seeking characteristics to private holding property. In this paper, empirical evidence indicates that efficiency of perks is affected by certain factors of transition period, to some extent, the inherent effect of perks as one kind of management incentive has been distorted.

关 键 词：在职消费 政治联系 产权性质 控股股东资金侵占 公司业绩 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]