企业社会责任与经理人薪酬激励有效性研究——战略性动机还是卸责借口?  

Research on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Incentive: Strategic Motivation or Shirking Excuse

作　　者：王新[1,2] 李彦霖[1,2] 李方舒[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学国际商学院,611130 [2]西南财经大学会计学院,611130

出　　处：《会计研究》2015年第10期51-58,97,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102181;71172228);西南财经大学中央高校创新团队项目"基于国际竞争力的中国企业成本管理创新"(JBK130508);西南财经大学"中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金"项目(JBK1507035)的资助

摘　　要：企业社会责任和利益相关者的诉求是影响经理人薪酬激励的潜在重要因素。本文以2009-2014年我国上市公司数据为样本,研究企业社会责任对经理人薪酬机制的影响。研究发现,社会责任可能成为国有企业经理人薪酬激励的新型代理因素和相机卸责的借口,特别是在国有企业面临业绩下滑、社会责任环境压力较大、股权分散的情况时,这种现象更为明显,而在民营企业中,并不存在这种现象。本文指出企业社会责任并非必然造成企业预算软约束和经理人薪酬激励效率的低下,针对国有企业经理人的薪酬考核,需要重点关注企业社会责任的业绩考评。CSR and the requirements of stakeholders are the potential important factors that affect the executive compensation incentive. This paper takes the listing corporation data of 2009- 2014 as sample,studies the influence of corporate social responsibility to the executive compensation mechanism. The paper found that CSR may be anew agent factor of executive compensation incentive and a 'shirking'excuse contingently in state- owned enterprises,this phenomenon is more obvious especially in declining performance,large CSR environmental pressure,and dispersed ownership in state- owned enterprises,but there is no such phenomenon in private enterprises. CSR does not inevitably lead to soft budget constraint and low executive compensation incentive efficiency,for the assessment of managers' compensation in state- owned enterprise,we need to focus on CSR performance evaluation.

关 键 词：社会责任 薪酬业绩敏感性 战略性动机 卸责借口 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]