基于股权激励机制的上市公司经营绩效分析  

Analysis of the Operating Performance of Listed Companies Based on Equity Incentive Mechanism

作　　者：白天[1] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学,北京100191

出　　处：《价值工程》2016年第1期31-34,共4页Value Engineering

摘　　要：本文通过对目前已经实施股权激励方案上市公司的实证分析,研究股权激励机制的作用,得出企业经理人的持股比例与企业业绩不相关的结论。结论显示:我国上市公司股权激励机制与经营绩效之间不存在显著正相关关系。最后通过对我国国有上市公司的简单分析,从资本市场、职业经理人市场、公司治理方面的制约与缺陷提出建言。Through empirical analysis of the listed companies which have implemented encouragement scheme of the stock option, this article studies the function of equity incentive mechanism, and comes to the conclusion that the shareholding ratio of the enterprise manager has nothing to do with the enterprise performance. The conclusion shows that there is no obvious positive correlation relationship between the equity incentive mechanism of listed company and operation performance. Finally, through simple analysis of the state-owned listed companies in China, suggestions are proposed from the restriction and deficiency of capital market, professional manager market and corporate governance.

关 键 词：股权激励机制 经营绩效 企业经理人 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]