家族企业外聘CEO类型、两权分离度与企业特质信息披露  

Non-family CEO Type,the Separation between Control Right and Cash Flow Right,and Firm Specific Information Disclosure in Family Firms

作　　者：许静静[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学商学院,上海200241

出　　处：《上海财经大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第6期90-100,共11页Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目(13YJC630193)

摘　　要：特质信息披露是企业有效投资决策及市场有效资源配置的基础,因此有关监管方及市场参与者对于外部大股东担任CEO对特质信息披露的影响应当予以关注。文章基于中国中小板2005-2012年家族企业样本,重点关注家族企业外聘CEO类型对企业特质信息披露的影响,借以探讨家族企业不同来源外聘高管的经济后果。文章重点关注当外聘CEO为前十大非家族自然人股东时,企业的特质信息披露程度,以及家族控股股东的控制权现金流权分离度对这一关系的影响。结果发现,较之其他来源的外聘CEO,前十大非家族自然人股东担任CEO的企业有着更少的企业特质信息披露,且这种关系只在具有两权分离度的企业样本中存在。研究结果表明,前十大非家族自然人股东担任CEO,降低了控股股东与外部股东之间的信息不对称程度,减轻了两权分离导致的较严重的第二层代理问题,从而降低了对企业特质信息披露的需求。Specific information disclosure is the basis of efficient firm investment decision and resources allocation of stock market, so relevant regulatory authorities and other stock market participants should pay attention to the effect of external big shareholder engaged to be CEO on specific information disclosure. This paper studies the effect of non-family CEO type on firm specific information disclosure based on family firms in Chinese SME board from 2005 to 2012, to discuss the economic consequences of different sources of non-family CEO in family firms. Specifically speaking, it pays attention to firm specific information disclosure when non-family CEOs are the big ten non-family natural person shareholders and the effect of the separation between control right and cash flow right as for family controlling shareholders on this relationship. It shows that compared to non-family CEO from other sources, firms with the big ten non-family natural person shareholders engaged to be CEOs have less firm specific information disclosure and this correlation is only found in family firms with the separation between control right and cash flow right. The results demonstrate that big ten non-family natural person shareholders engaged to be CEOs give rise to the reduction in information asymmetry between controlling and non-con trolling shareholders, the attenuation of more serious second-layer agency problem resulting from the separation between control right and cash flow right, thereby decreasing the demand for firm specific information disclosure.

关 键 词：家族企业 外聘CEO 两权分离 特质信息披露 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]