所有权性质、高管薪酬与企业无关多元化  

Ownership, Executive Compensation and Corporate Unrelated Diversification

作　　者：李胜楠[1] 曾格凯茜 吴泥锦 解延宏 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部会计与财务管理系,天津300072 [2]天津财税智能化技术工程中心,天津300072

出　　处：《华东交通大学学报》2015年第6期122-131,共10页Journal of East China Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71002104);国家自然科学基金项目(71172067);国家社会科学基金青年项目(13CGL034)

摘　　要：企业是否选择多元化及其多元化的类型对企业投资战略和价值将会产生深远影响。以2008年至2013年我国A股上市公司作为研究样本,使用国泰安数据库,对数据进行处理,通过实证研究,发现公司终极控制人性质对高管薪酬与公司无关多元化战略之间关系的影响有显著差异。在非国有终极控制的企业中,高管当期货币化薪酬、股权性薪酬与无关多元化均呈显著负相关关系,且股权性薪酬与无关多元化负相关程度更小;但是在国有终极控制的企业中,高管股权性薪酬与无关多元化呈显著负相关关系,而高管当期货币化薪酬与无关多元化呈倒U型关系。这些结论为我国混合所有制改革以及高管薪酬的优化提供了重要的经验证据和启示。To reveal the corporate ownership structure has signficant impact on the relationship between the executive compensation and the corporate＇s unrelated diversity strategy, this study manually examined data of the securities listed in China A-Share market between 2008 and 2013. It processed the related corporates＇ informa tion sourced from Guotai Junan Securities＇ database. It found out that the ownership significantly affected the influence of executive compensation on unrelated diversification; in non-state-controlled companies, executives＇ current monetization pay and stock option equity showed a significant negative correlation with unrelated diversification, and the negative coefficient of stock option became much smaller; but in state-owned enterprises, the stock option and unrelated diversification demonstrated a significant negative correlation. Morever, the current monetization pay and unrelated diversification were in inverted U-shaped relationship. These conclutions provide important emprical evidence and enlightment for China＇s mixed ownership economy reform and the optimisation of executive compenastion.

关 键 词：无关多元化 高管薪酬 所有权性质 股票期权 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]