创业板市场高管“妒忌”心理对企业过度投资的影响  

作　　者：李春玲[1] 李念[1] 任莉莉[2] 

机构地区：[1]燕山大学经济管理学院 [2]中国人民大学商学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2015年第12期57-62,共6页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"股权激励与公司价值-基于公司控制权配置视角的研究"(批准号:71102153);河北省高等学校人文社会科学重点项目"国有企业混合所有制改革中的高管激励机制构建与效果评价"(批准号:SD151028)

摘　　要：本文选取了我国创业板上市公司2012—2014年数据,以高管外部薪酬差距作为高管妒忌心理的替代变量,对企业投资效率进行了衡量,发现94.14%样本存在过度投资现象。然后,进一步建立逻辑模型,推导了高管妒忌心理可能引发企业过度投资的机理并提出研究假设,对此假设进行了实证检验。结果表明:高管妒忌心理对企业过度投资有显著正向影响;高管学历不但与企业过度投资显著负相关,而且通过调节效应,有效地抑制了高管妒忌心理对过度投资的影响。This paper selects the samples of the GEM Listed Companies in China from 2012 to 2014. Top managers＂ envy is measured by the compensation gap between their compensation and the average level of the same industry. 94.14% of the selected samples have the condition of over-investment. Subsequently, a logical model is established to reason the mechanism driv- en by top managers＂ envy and then research hypotheses are put forward. We empirically test the hypotheses and find evi- dence that： the top managers＂ envy has significant and positive influence on over-investment; both the moderator variable （the top managers＂ education background） and the interaction item consisting of the former and top manager＇s envy have a significant and negative relationship with over-investment. Moreover, the top managers＂ education background has weaken the relationship between over-investment of companies and their top managers＂ envy.

关 键 词：高管 妒忌 过度投资 外部公平性 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]