技术独立董事对大股东利益侵占有抑制作用吗?——以大股东私有占款为例  

Can Technology Independent Directors Deter the Benefits Expropriation by Substantial Shareholders: Taking Fund Embezzlement of Large Shareholders as an Example

作　　者：胡元木[1] 秦娴[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《南京审计学院学报》2016年第1期32-41,共10页journal of nanjing audit university

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(13BGL026);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2013GM006)

摘　　要：大股东利益侵占行为日益受到上市公司和政府以及中小投资者的关注,而技术独立董事的专业背景和独立身份使其对大股东利益侵占行为可能具有独特的监督作用。从独立董事专业背景的角度出发,以大股东对上市公司"掏空"行为作为研究对象,探讨技术独立董事对大股东利益侵占的影响,结果表明:聘请拥有本行业技术背景的独立董事能够有效抑制大股东利益侵占的行为;技术独立董事的薪酬能够对其监督作用的发挥起到激励作用。The behavior of benefits expropriation by substantial shareholders is increasingly concerned by the listed companies and the government as well as the medium and small investors,while the professional background and the independent status of the independent directors make it possible to have a special supervisory role in the benefits expropriation by substantial shareholders. Deriving from the perspective of professional background of independent directors,taking the“tunneling”be-havior on the part of substantial shareholders in listed company as the research object,this paper makes an exploration on the effect of technology independent directors on the benefits expropriation by substantial shareholders. The results demonstrate that listed companies hiring independent directors who possesses technical skills or has the technical background of the industry tend to effectively inhibit benefits expropriation by substantial shareholders and the compensation level of technology independ-ent directors have incentive effects on the supervision efficiency.

关 键 词：技术独立董事 大股东利益侵占 薪酬激励 大股东占款 内部治理 最终控股股东 中小股东 关联交易 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]