波普尔、归纳问题与理性  

Popper:the Problem of Induction and Rationality

作　　者：黄敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系

出　　处：《世界哲学》2016年第1期97-105,160,共9页World Philosophy

摘　　要：波普尔的证伪主义是否真地解决了休谟的归纳问题,学界的回答通常是否定的,人们认为,波普尔所谓的证伪主义暗中引入了归纳。艾伦·马斯格雷夫于2004年为波普尔作出了辩护,这种辩护在某种意义上改变了波普尔的观点,但也为他的哲学图景增加了一些富有活力的要素。本文试图结合这一辩护策略,重新考虑证伪主义的理性主义内涵,并在此基础上勾勒出逻辑、心灵以及理性这三者之间如何相互关联的概念地图。About the question whether Popper has resolved Hume's problem of induction,the received view is negative.People believe his so-called falsificationism smuggles induction in.Alan Musgrave made a defence for Popper in 2004,which has somehow changed his view and brought in some refreshing elements.The paper attempts,in the light from this defence,to reconsider the rationalist implications of falsificationism,and further,to outline a conceptual map that uncovers the relations between logic,mind and rationality.

关 键 词：理性 归纳问题 逻辑 心灵 波普尔 

分 类 号：B503.92[哲学宗教—外国哲学]