政府激励条件下的闭环供应链协调应对突发事件研究  

The Impact of Emergencies on the Closed-Loop Supply Chain Coordination under Government Reimbursement

作　　者：覃艳华[1] 曹细玉[2] 宋巧娜[1] 阮平[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学中山学院管理学院,中国中山528402 [2]电子科技大学中山学院经贸学院,中国中山528402

出　　处：《湖南师范大学自然科学学报》2015年第2期62-67,共6页Journal of Natural Science of Hunan Normal University

基　　金：电子科技大学中山学院科研团队培育基金资助项目(411YT01);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(S2013010013437)

摘　　要：考虑由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的闭环供应链,制造商负责产品的制造与再制造,零售商负责产品的销售和废旧品的回收,并将回收来的废旧品卖给制造商进行再制造,政府将对制造商回收废旧品进行激励.首先分析了正常情况下回馈与惩罚契约对闭环供应链的协调作用;然后分析了突发事件导致顾客需求及废旧品回收两个市场规模同时变化对闭环供应链的影响,研究表明闭环供应链在原回馈与惩罚契约下的协调将失效,为此给出了闭环供应链应对突发事件的策略,指出调整后的回馈与惩罚契约具有抗突发事件性.This study considers a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer,where the manufacturer is responsible for manufacturing and remanufacturing of products,the retailer is responsible for product sales and recycling of waste products to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. The government will encourage and reward manufacturers for recycling. The coordination function with rebate and penalty contract under normal circumstances was analyzed firstly. Then the impact of emergencies which change the size of demand market and recycling market on the closed-loop supply chain was studied. The results show that this coordination may be hampered by an emergency under the original rebate and penalty contract,therefore,an optimal strategy is given to response to the emergency,pointing out that an adjusted rebate and penalty contract has the ability to effectively response to an emergency.

关 键 词：政府激励 突发事件 回馈与惩罚契约 闭环供应链协调 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]