CEO vs CFO:女性高管能否抑制财务舞弊行为  

CEO vs CFO:Can Female Executives Restrain Financial Fraud?

作　　者：周泽将[1] 刘中燕[2] 胡瑞[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230601 [2]安徽大学经济学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《上海财经大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第1期50-63,共14页Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71302113);安徽省教育厅高校优秀青年人才基金重点项目(2013SQRW005ZD);安徽省哲学社会科学青年项目(AHSKQ2015D52)

摘　　要：女性高管已经对企业决策产生了重要影响。文章以中国资本市场2000年至2012年A股上市公司为样本,实证分析了女性高管及其不同类型与财务舞弊行为之间的关系。研究表明:总体而言,女性高管显著抑制了财务舞弊行为;区分女性高管类型后,发现女性CFO对于财务舞弊产生了抑制作用,而女性CEO则促使财务舞弊行为的发生,女性其他高管对财务舞弊的影响不显著。进一步将研究区间划分为企业会计准则2006实施前后两个阶段,发现上述效应主要存在于企业会计准则2006实施后阶段。文章的研究结论揭示,在中国鼓励发挥女性高管积极作用的同时,应制定女性高管的分类监管政策并完善女性高管履职的外部制度。Female executives have exerted an important effect on corporate decisions. This pa- per uses A-share listed companies from 2000 to 2012 in China＇s capital market as the sample, and empirically analyzes the relationship between female executives （including its types） and financial fraud. It comes to the results as follows, firstly, in general, female executives restrain financial fraud significantly; secondly, while female executives are divided into several types, it finds that female CFOs play an inhibition role in financial fraud, but female CEOs even promote financial fraud, and other types of ~ema｜e executives have no significant impacts on financial fraud. Fur- thermore, when research range is separated into before and after the implementation of Chinese Accounting Standard （CAS） 2006, the effects above-mentioned mainly exist in the duration after CAS 2006. The research conclusions reveal that while encouraging female executives to play a positive role in China, it should also pay attention to classified regulatory policy setting and exter- nal institution of the performance of duties in terms of female executives.

关 键 词：女性高管 女性CFO 女性CEO财务舞弊 会计准则 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理] C913.68[经济管理—国民经济]