职业经理人的两难困境:忠实于大股东还是企业?——基于国美电器控制权之争的思考  

Professional Managers' Dilemmas:Faithful to Larger Shareholders or Business?——Thinking Based on the Control Conflict of GOME Ltd

作　　者：陈东华[1] 

机构地区：[1]宁波大红鹰学院经济与管理学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（中）》2016年第1期85-88,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"基于策略互动实验方法的大股东控制权私利形成机理研究:影响因素与伦理决策"(项目编号:71272143);教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目"基于S-C-P的控制权私人收益的形成机制及其市场效率研究"(项目编号:10YJA630053);浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题"全流通背景下大股东控制权私利行为演进成因及治理机制研究"(项目编号:15NDJC065YB);浙江省社科联重点项目"小微企业和谐劳动关系构建研究:影响因素与干预政策"(项目编号:2014Z019)阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文从委托代理理论、控制权配置与控制权私利视角来解读国美电器控制权之争,并讨论职业经理人的两难困境:忠实于大股东还是企业。本文指出职业经理人应忠实于全体股东和企业,而不仅是大股东,但也不能为了争夺控制权而不顾大股东的利益诉求,甚至与创始大股东形成对抗。最后,笔者提出避免职业经理人步入两难困境的对策。This article interprets the control conflict of GOME from the theory of principal-agent and the allocation of control rights and the private benefits of control perspective,and tries to answer the question that professional managers' dilemmas:Faithful to larger shareholders or business.Finally draws a conclusion that professional managers should be faithful to all shareholders,loyal to business,not only the larger shareholders,but not to fight for control rights disregarding of the larger shareholders' interests,or even conflict with the founding larger shareholders.At last,this article puts forward countermeasures to avoid professional managers to step into a dilemma.

关 键 词：职业经理人 委托代理理论 控制权配置 控制权私利 

分 类 号：F721.7[经济管理—产业经济]