产品替代程度、知识共享与企业合作R&D  

Substitution degree of the Product, Knowledge Sharing and Enterprise R&D Cooperation

作　　者：傅建华[1] 张莉[1] 程仲鸣[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖北科技学院经济管理学院,湖北咸宁437100 [2]温州大学商学院,浙江温州325035

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2016年第1期1-8,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助项目(13YJA630013);2013年度湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究重点资助项目(13d117);浙江省自然科学基金面上资助项目(LY14G020008);国家社科基金一般资助项目(14BGL036)

摘　　要：企业研发活动中,技术溢出的外部效应是企业研发投资决策的重要影响因素,本文针对企业R&D合作成果不完全互补的情形,从技术溢出以外生自然技术溢出和内生知识共享交互并存的视角,构建了三阶段动态博弈模型,运用逆向归纳方法确定企业最优知识共享水平、合作R&D(不合作)资源投入和合作R&D(不合作)产量。结果表明:无论研发是否合作,最大化内生性知识共享程度是双赢均衡策略;当企业采取合作R&D决策时,无论产品替代程度如何,企业利润和社会福利都要大于不合作时的情形,但当产品替代程度较小时,企业并不具备合作R&D的积极性;企业采取自主研发决策时,产品替代程度越大,企业自主研发投入的对社会总体福利损害越大,因而当产品替代较大时企业不宜采用自主研发模式进行创新。本文为企业合作R&D的研究提供了改进了的理论框架,并可为企业合作创新实践提供参考。Knowledge is regarded as the key resource in competition among enterprises. More and more companies would like to develop new technology through alliance and boost knowledge level and ability via R＆D cooperation. However, R＆D cooperation among enterprises is complicated because of incomplete complementarities and exogenous spillover effect caused by R＆D cooperation. Scholars all over the world make extensive research on R＆D cooperation. The current research is primarily based on two premises. First, technological spillover is an exogenous variable and the variable can be decided based on industrial technology characteristics, market forces, etc. Second, products made during the process of R＆D cooperation is fairly homogenous. Enterprise-level R＆D cooperation achievement could be completely absorbed by members. Based on the characteristics of spreading and spillover effect by different knowledge, this paper divides technological spillover into two categories： natural technological spillover and endogenous knowledge sharing. Knowledge spillover exists in two ways. National technological spillover is considered an exogenous variable due to unconscious and involuntary spreading. Endogenous knowledge sharing is innovation spillover caused by mutual benefits and volnntarism of enterprises. Knowledge spillover including explicit knowledge and implicit knowledge could be spread through interactions between natural technological spillover and endogenous knowledge sharing. As a result, we construct a dynamic three-stage game model under the situation of incomplete complementarities caused by R＆D cooperation among enterprises. The game model can also improve the Nash equilibrium by using the backward induction method. In the first stage, enterprises would fix the optimal level of knowledge sharing based on the principle of profit maximization. In the second stage, we could decide the best R＆D investment. In the third stage, companies would make sure the output by Cournot competition in the market is obtai

关 键 词：产品替代率 知识共享 自主研发 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]