基于创业链声誉的风险投资与风险企业合作的微分对策模型研究  

Differential Game Models of Cooperation of Venture Capital and Entrepreneur Based on Entrepreneurship Chain Reputation

作　　者：赵黎明[1] 刘猛 郝琳娜[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2016年第1期168-175,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972117)

摘　　要：利用微分对策理论研究了风险投资和风险企业的合作问题,且基于外部投资者视角将其合作过程抽象为"创业链声誉"的构建过程,构建了一个微分对策动态模型,运用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程求出风险投资和风险企业在Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈及协同合作博弈条件下的最优策略,并对此三种博弈结构下的反馈均衡结果进行了比较。研究结果显示,协同合作博弈情形下的系统收益、参与双方的收益水平要优于Nash非合作、Stackelberg博弈情形下的收益水平,而风险企业的激励因子是系统中的一种协调和激励机制,可以提高风投和企业以及整个系统的收益。Risk investment is an important source of funds for the development of new technology industry. All aspects of risk investment have been actively researched and discussed by academia. Risk investment affects the principal-agent relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Early venture investment model assumes that the relationship of entrepreneur and risk investment is one kind of tmilateral principal-agent relationships. The model discusses how venture capitalists design contract to motivate and supervise entrepreneurs to work hard. The current research primarily focuses on information asymmetry and optimal contract design issues. However, there are only a few literatures focusing on entrepreneurs＇ incentive problems of venture capitalists. This paper introduces the ＂incentive scheme＂ which is a common venture financing tool for risk investment project. The scheme employs the methodology of differential games to investigate the optimal strategy of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg leader-follower game and coordinated cooperative game in a dynamic setup respectively. The feedback equilibrium outcomes in the three game structures are comparatively analyzed. In this article, the whole process of cooperation between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs is defined as the business chain. By analyzing approaches and tools used for dynamic entrepreneurship chain coordination, this paper explores an important problem： the differential game for entrepreneurship chains based on continuous time. In the first section, this paper indicates that the dynamic entrepreneurship chain coordination is based on continuous time. It shows that the optimal decision of a decision-maker （game participant） at one time cannot ensure that the same optimal decision can be made in the following periods. This finding means that a decision-maker＇s action （decision variable） is also a function of time. In other words, the games between entrepreneurship chain m

关 键 词：创业链声誉 风险投资 微分对策 反馈均衡 HJB方程 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]