碳排放权管理制度应对宏观经济冲击的效果分析——以EU-ETS为例及其对中国的启示  

The Effect of EUA Supply Policy on Macroeconomic Shock:Empirical Analysis of EU-ETS and the Revelation to China

作　　者：袁嫄[1] 刘纪显[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东财经大学金融学院,广东广州510320 [2]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510631

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2016年第5期204-210,共7页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"碳资产的特殊风险与收益研究"(11BJY143);广东省社科规划基金重大资助项目(打造"理论粤军"重大资助项目)"主体功能区规划下广东生态交易的理论探索──基于碳配额交易的视角"(LLYJ1318);教育部规划基金项目"国际碳资产组合选择与定价"(10YJA790114);广东财经大学校级课题"主体功能区划下生态配额的分配与定价机制在广东省生态补偿中的应用研究"(14YB79003)

摘　　要：次贷危机和欧债危机造成欧盟碳排放权总量过剩,影响碳排放权市场的减排效率。TARCH-M模型的检验结果表明紧缩性的碳排放权管理制度缓解了宏观经济冲击的市场化碳减排方式负面影响,投资者的风险偏好类型也从风险中性转向风险厌恶,但是欧盟在京都履约期缺乏弹性的碳配额供给政策使过剩的碳排放权在短期内难以完全消除。欧盟的经验提示中国应尽早建立碳配额供给弹性调节机制,发挥碳排放权价格的资源配置功能。Emission allowance surplus affect the efficiency of carbon market due to the Subprime Crisis and European debt crisis. The result of GARCH model suggests that bad news has greater impact on carbon market activities than good news, and the asymmetry before the change of supply policy is stronger than that after the change. Investors in carbon market turned to risk aversion from risk neutral after the change of carbon supply policy. It means that severe carbon supply policy can reduce the behavior of free EUA over allocation, which effectively eliminates speculative motive and improves market stability. It is necessary for China to build a flexible emission allowance supply system to avoid allowance surplus which has already happened in EU- ETS.

关 键 词：碳排放权管理制度 宏观经济冲击 杠杆效应 风险偏好 GARCH模型 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学] F113.3[经济管理—国际贸易]