家族企业权力配置对会计稳健性影响的实证分析  

Family enterprise power configuration affect accounting conservatism

作　　者：邓建平[1] 陈爱华[2] 

机构地区：[1]厦门国家会计学院研究生处,福建厦门361005 [2]厦门国家会计学院教学研究中心,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《长安大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第1期36-41,共6页Journal of Chang'an University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(13YJC630019);福建省社会科学规划项目(2013B057;FJ2015C133)

摘　　要：以2005~2014年福建省家族企业作为研究对象,考察家族企业的权力配置对企业会计稳健性的影响。通过对310个样本企业的实证分析发现,与家族企业实际控制人不担任董事长和总经理任何一个职位的企业相比,家族企业实际控制人担任董事长、总经理之一或者同时担任董事长和总经理的企业,会计稳健性更差;家族控制力越强,会计稳健性越差。研究结果表现,家族介入企业运营管理削弱了企业会计信息质量。In this paper,taking the family listed companies in Fujian during 2005 and 2014 as the research object,this paper discussed the effect of power configuration of the family enterprises on accounting conservatism. Through the empirical analysis of 310 sample companies,it＇s discovered that,if the actual controllers of family enterprises hold the position of board chairman or general manager or both of them,the accounting conservatism is worse than that of those family enterprises in which actual controllers hold no position of chairman or general manager. The stronger the family control force is,the worse accounting conservatism will be. These findings indicate that the families＇ involvement in the enterprises＇ management and operation can weaken the quality of accounting information.

关 键 词：家族企业 权力配置 会计稳健性 会计信息质量 上市公司 福建省 

分 类 号：F275.2[经济管理—企业管理]