家族控制的上市公司更加“乐善好施”吗  

Are the Family-controlled Listed Companies More Willing to Donate?

作　　者：蔡地[1] 沈达勇 刘雪萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100 [2]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2016年第2期103-114,128,共12页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"转型经济背景下我国家族企业的创新活动:内部治理结构和外部制度环境的影响"(71302090);中国博士后基金面上资助项目"治理结构;制度环境与我国家族企业研发投入"(2013M531622);山东大学自主创新基金项目"创业投资对我国创业企业成长影响的研究"(2013GN005)

摘　　要：利用2004-2012年间A股上市公司数据,实证检验了家族控制对我国上市公司慈善捐赠行为的影响。实证结果分析表明:总体而言,同非家族控制的上市公司相比,家族控制的上市公司更有可能进行慈善捐赠,且捐赠的额度更大。进一步的分析发现,家族控制对公司慈善捐赠行为的上述正向影响主要源自家族成员积极参与管理和不存在现金流权和投票权分离的公司。上述研究结论有助于深化我们对中国公司慈善捐赠行为的前因以及家族控制治理后果的理解。This paper empirically tests the effects of family control on the charitable donation behaviors of Chinese listed companies by using the data of A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2012. The empirical results indicate: generally speaking,in comparison with the listed companies that are not controlled by families,the listed companies that are controlled by families are more probable to conduct charitable donation and they donate more. Further analysis finds that the above-mentioned positive effects of family control on companies' charitable donation behaviors are mainly caused by that the family members actively take part in and manage the companies where the cash flow power and voting right are not separated. The above-mentioned research conclusions are conductive to understanding why China wants to deepen the charitable donation behaviors of Chinese companies and the harnessing aftermath of family control.

关 键 词：家族企业 家族控制 家族参与管理 现金流权和投票权分离 慈善捐赠 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理]