博弈视角下PPP项目定价与特许权期决策模型  

Decision-making Model on Price and Concession Term for PPP Project under the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：孙慧[1] 李磊[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2016年第1期52-56,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271143)

摘　　要：为研究PPP项目定价与特许权期的决策问题,运用不完全信息静态博弈理论与方法,建立了招投标阶段PPP项目定价和特许权期的决策模型,通过模型求解,证明存在关于定价和特许权期的最优机制。在该机制下,社会福利达到最大,政府能够招到实力较强的社会资本方。研究表明:政府可以适当降低价格以减轻公众的负担;应该给予实力较强的社会资本方更长的特许权期;价格制定应考虑预期使用者的数量及其稳定性。In this paper, a decision -making model on price and concession period for a PPP project is established, based on the theory of static game with incomplete information. By solving the model, it is proved that there exists an optimal decision - making mechanism on price and concession period in a PPP project, under which the social welfare will be maximized and the government will be able to select the most competent concessionaire. Three important suggestions are provided： first, the govern- ment could lower the price properly so as to reduce the burden of the public ; second, a PPP project with longer concession period should be offered to concessionaire with higher management level ; third, the number of expected users and its stability should be taken into consideration when deciding the price.

关 键 词：PPP项目 最优机制 博弈论 特许权期 项目定价 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]