家族企业、信息泄露及内幕交易可能性  

Family Business,Information Disclosure and Insider Trading Possibilities

作　　者：何金财[1,2] 马刚[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074 [2]西南财经大学经济与管理研究院,成都611130

出　　处：《重庆工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第3期40-49,共10页Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：重庆市社会科学规划博士项目(2015BS073)

摘　　要：利用事件研究法,本文实证分析了家族企业在信息泄露和内幕交易可能性等方面与非家族控股类企业的差异性。结果表明:对于利好消息,家族控股类企业在信息公告之前30个窗口期内的累计异常收益率显著高于非家族控股类企业(约高出1.5%),说明家族企业存在着更为明显的信息泄露问题,其发生内幕交易的可能性较非家族控股类企业更为明显;而对于利空消息,两类股权组织结构不同的企业间并未表现出显著差异。By using the method of case study,this paper empirically studied the difference between family business and non-family business on the disclosure of information and the possibilities of inside-trading. The result shows that for the good news,the cumulative abnormal return of family business was significantly higher than the non-family business( approximately higher 1.5%) in the 30 window periods before the announcement of the information. It illustrates that family business has a more obvious information leakage problem,the possibility of insider trading is much larger than the non-family business. But for the bad news,there is no significant difference between these two different equity structure firms.

关 键 词：家族企业 信息泄露 内幕交易 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理]