对累积投票制的强制性规定有效吗?  

Does mandatory provision of cumulative voting system work?

作　　者：陈玉罡[1] 许金花[1] 李善民[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广州510275

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2016年第3期34-47,共14页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372147);广东高校人文社科重大攻关资助项目(11ZGXM63002)

摘　　要：2002年发布的《上市公司治理准则》要求控股股东持股比例超过30%的上市公司选举董事时应当采用累积投票制,并将这一制度写入公司章程.这条强制性规定是否有效地发挥了治理掏空的作用?基于2001年前上市的966家在章程中写入了累积投票制的公司样本,运用2002年-2010年的面板数据对这些公司在章程中写入累积投票制前后掏空的差异进行了检验.实证结果表明上市公司在章程中写入了累积投票制后,掏空程度显著下降.但这一治理效应在控股股东持股比例低于30%的样本中最强,而在控股股东持股比例超过50%的样本中显著减弱.非国有上市公司中累积投票制的治理效应强于国有上市公司.直接制约掏空的改革措施出台后,累积投票制的治理效应减弱.从研究结果来看,《上市公司治理准则》中以持股比例30%为分界点进行的强制性规定并未达到预期效果.随着直接制约掏空的改革措施出台,累积投票制的强制性规定已不适用于当前的制度背景.The ＂Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed Companies＂, issued in 2002, requires that the companies with controlling shareholder stake of more than 30 % should adopt a cumulative voting system in the election of directors, and that this system should be written into the articles of association. Is this mandatory requirement effective in reducing tunneling？ Based on a sample of 966 listed companies that were listed before 2001 and the cumulative voting system was written into their articles of association, and using the panel data between 2002 and 2010, the differences between before and after the cumulative voting system was written into the articles of association are tested. The empirical results show that after the cumulative voting system has been written into the articles of association, tunneling decreased significantly. However, this governance effect is strongest in companies with controlling shareholder stake of less than 30 %, and is significantly weakened in companies with controlling shareholder stake of more than 50 %. The governance effect of the cumulative voting system in non-state-owned listed companies is stronger than in state-owned listed companies. After the government provided direct governance reform measures to reduce tunneling, the governance effect of the cumula- tive voting system weakened. The results show that the mandatory requirement for a stake of 30 % as the cut- off point in the ＂Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed Companies＂ did not achieve the desired results. With the introduction of direct governance reform measures to reduce tunneling, the mandatory provision of the cumulative voting system does not work anymore under the current background.

关 键 词：累积投票制 公司治理 公司章程 投资者保护 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理] F830.91[经济管理—国民经济]