债权人能够影响高管薪酬契约的制定吗——基于我国上市公司债务成本约束的视角  

Can Creditors Influence the Design of Executive Compensation Contract? Based on Perspective of Listing Corporations' Debt Cost Constraint in China

作　　者：熊剑[1,2] 王金[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学国际商学院 [2]暨南大学管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2016年第2期42-51,共10页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71032006)资助

摘　　要：我国上市公司高管薪酬制度改革正逐步推进,72家央企也于2015年1月1日正式公布并实施最新薪酬改革方案,而此时我国债权人法律保护亦不断完善,到底债权人对公司高管薪酬契约制定有何影响呢?本文基于债务成本约束视角,利用近十年我国A股上市公司的数据,实证研究了债权人对公司高管薪酬激励契约产生的影响,结果发现:(1)当公司债务成本增加时,高管薪酬与业绩之间的敏感性会降低,债务成本与高管薪酬—业绩敏感性显著负相关;(2)进一步通过产权差异研究发现,相对于民企,在国企中债务成本对高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的降低作用更为显著。研究结论表明,中国的上市公司债权人能够对公司的治理决策产生影响,企业在制定管理人员薪酬契约时会考虑债权人的利益,并且在国企中会表现得更明显,债权人对高管薪酬激励在一定程度上能够起到外部监管及治理的作用,其监管作用的大小会因债务成本的高低和产权性质而有差异。The reform of executives compensation system in listed companies is pushing forward, and in January 1,2015,72 central enterprises have officially announced and implemented the latest salary reform program and at the same time the law of protecting the minority shareholders and creditors in our country are also gradually improving. However, whether the pay reform will be able to really solve the problem of encouraging executives in company？ One key problem that is worth thinking about is that： what impact of the company’s creditors on the executive pay contract in the end？ Meanwhile China market economy is also in the transition period, so in this special context, this article uses the sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2006-2014, makes an empirical research on the impact of the debt cost constraint on the incentive intensity between the listing corporation executive compensation, and the research findings are as follow：（1） with the increase of corporate liabilities, the cost of debt is higher, the executive pay-performance sensitivity is lower, and the sensitivity of debt cost with respect to the executive compensation-performance is negatively correlated;（2） Considering the difference of enterprise property rights in China, this paper makes a further research on the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, the results show that： Under the influence of the nature of the ownership of enterprises, relative to private enterprises, in the state-owned enterprises, the impact of debt cost on executive pay incentives is greater. The conclusion of this paper shows that because of the cost of debt, the creditors as a kind of external supervision mechanism, can affect the company’s executive compensation contract through the formulation, also, to some degree, the creditors’ supervision can be used as an alternative to corporate governance, finally, this article confirms that China listing corporation creditors can inf luence corporate governance decisions, and shareholders will

关 键 词：激励契约 债务治理 债权人监管 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]