企业避税、信息不对称与管理层在职消费  

Corporate Tax Sheltering Activities, Information Asymmetry and Managerial Perk Consumption

作　　者：廖歆欣[1] 刘运国[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2016年第2期87-99,共13页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71572197;71372150)资助

摘　　要：与工资、奖金等显性薪酬相比,隐性的在职消费更依赖于信息不对称的存在,而企业激进的避税活动能够增加公司经营结构和财务的复杂性及模糊性,提高内部人和外部股东之间的信息不对称程度,为管理层的在职消费提供庇护。本文以2008-2012年1所有A股上市公司为样本,研究了管理层在职消费与企业避税程度之间的关系。研究发现,管理层的在职消费与企业的避税程度正相关,而这一正相关关系随着来自公司内部和外部监管力量的增强而降低。最后,本文用二阶段回归(2SLS)方法和中介变量法进行了稳健性检验,一定程度上消除了因变量和自变量间可能存在的内生性或逆向因果关系对结论的干扰。Compared with explicit incentives such as monetary salary, bonus and stock options, the implicit incentives, which include managerial perk consumption and other sorts of incentives, rely more on the existence of information asymmetry between the insider and external stakeholders, due to its difficulty of being observed. As a consequence, firm’s aggressive tax sheltering activities could provide effective shelters for manager’s diversion activities, in the form of managerial perk consumption, by increasing the complexity and ambiguity of firms’ operational and financial activities, which results in even higher information asymmetry and more severe agency problems between the insiders and outside shareholders. Thus, this paper studies the relationship between the extent of managerial perk consumption and the aggressiveness of corporate tax sheltering activities, and tries to provide empirical evidences for it, by using the firm-year data of all A-type Share listed firms in China between 2008 and 2012. The empirical results support our entire hypothesis by showing that the level of managerial perk consumption is positively related to the extent of a firm’s tax sheltering aggressiveness. In addition, this positive correlation is mitigated by internal corporate governance, supported by the evidences that the positive correlation becomes weaker in firms with higher shareholding ratio of the first majority shareholder, and becomes even stronger in firms with CEO duality, compared with those firms with lower shareholding ratio of the first majority shareholder and those without CEO duality, respectively. What’s more, the positive relation mentioned above is also mitigated by external corporate governance, supported by the evidences that the positive correlation becomes weaker if the firm locates in the areas with higher intense level of product market competition and in the firms with higher total leverage, compared with those firms which locate in the areas with lower intense level of product market competitio

关 键 词：在职消费 信息不对称 避税程度 监管 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]