食品安全政府监管的动态演化分析  

Analysis of Dynamic Evolution of Government Supervision of Food Safety

作　　者：王冀宁[1] 于智明[1] 陈庭强[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学经济与管理学院,南京211816

出　　处：《中国调味品》2016年第5期156-160,共5页China Condiment

基　　金：国家社科基金重大招标项目(12&ZD204);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71173103)

摘　　要：针对频频出现的食品安全问题,运用演化博弈的方法,在构建地方政府与食品企业策略互动支付矩阵的基础上,分析了食品企业与地方政府两个行为主体策略选择的动态演化过程。研究表明:针对现阶段我国食品安全监管体制存在的缺陷,能够从两方面进行有效应对:(1)提高中央政府对地方的视察频度,且地方政府必须对违规食品企业处以高额的罚款;(2)地方政府对食品企业实施合理的补贴政策,提高食品企业的利润。For the food safety problems that occur frequently,apply the method of evolutionary game theory,based on the construction of local government and food enterprise strategy interaction payment matrix,to analyze the dynamic evolution process of food enterprises and local government two behavior subjects＇ strategy choice.The research shows that in view of the defects in the present stage of our country in food safety regulatory system,can effectively deal with from two aspects：（1）increase the central government＇s inspection frequency on local government,and the local government must punish the illegal food enterprises with heavy fines;（2）the local government implements the reasonable subsidy policy on food enterprises to improve food enterprises＇ profits.

关 键 词：食品安全 政府监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号：TS201.6[轻工技术与工程—食品科学]