克里普克的先验偶然命题与西方哲学传统  

Kripke's Contingent a Priori Propositions and the Western Philosophy Tradition

作　　者：聂大海[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学,长春130012

出　　处：《外语学刊》2016年第3期20-23,共4页Foreign Language Research

基　　金：吉林大学基本科研业务费哲学社会科学研究种子基金项目"克里普克语言指称理论研究"(2015ZZ022)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：克里普克否认一切先验知识都是必然的传统主张,认为先验、后验是认识论概念,必然和偶然是形而上学概念,因此存在先验偶然命题。本文主要在批判与继承西方哲学传统的基础上讨论克里普克的先验偶然命题,以期深化对其的理解。According to Kripke,the notion of a priority and a posterity are not the notion of metaphysics,but of epistemology. And the notion of necessity and contingency are not the notion of epistemology,but of metaphysics. It means that Kripke denies all prior knowledge are necessary and believes contingent a priori truth do exist. This paper mainly discusses the truth of Kripke’s contingent a priori proposition in the western philosophy tradition,in order to deepen the understanding of Kripke’s view on it.

关 键 词：先验偶然命题 形而上学 严格指示词 分析命题 综合命题 

分 类 号：B089[哲学宗教—哲学理论]