政治关联、两权分离与盈余管理——基于中国上市家族企业的实证研究  

Political Connection,Separation of the Two Rights and Earnings Management:Empirical Research on Chinese Family Listed Enterprises

作　　者：陈建林[1,2] 刘天溶 

机构地区：[1]广东财经大学会计学院,广东广州510320 [2]广东财经大学会计与资本市场研究中心,广东广州510320

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2016年第3期56-64,共9页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71202097);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC630009);广东省自然科学基金项目(S2012010010844);广东省高校优秀青年教师培养计划项目(Yqgdufe1401)

摘　　要：以2009—2013年家族企业为样本,分析家族企业两权分离度对盈余管理的影响以及政治关联对于家族企业两权分离度和盈余管理关系的调节作用,研究发现:两权分离度越大,家族企业盈余质量越低,盈余管理水平越高;政治关联对于家族企业两权分离度与盈余管理之间的关系起到负向调节作用,存在政治关联的家族企业,两权分离度对盈余管理的作用越弱,企业盈余质量越高。Taking family enterprises from 2009 to 2013 as samples,this paper studies not only the impact on earnings management brought by the separation degree of two rights of family enterprises,but also the regulating effect of political connection on the relationship between the separation degree of two rights of family enterprises and earnings management. The study finds that： the greater the separation degree of two rights is,the poorer the earnings quality of family enterprises becomes and the higher the earnings management level is; political connection plays a negative role in regulating the relationship between the separation degree of two rights of family enterprises and earnings management,and enterprises with political connection will present higher earnings quality on the condition that the impact of separation degree of two rights on earnings management becomes poorer.

关 键 词：两权分离度 盈余管理 政治关联 家族企业 财务管理 市场化程度 资产收益率 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]