高管薪酬、企业绩效激励效应与政府限薪令影响——133家A股国有控股公司的实证研究  

The Incentive Effect of Executive Compensation on Enterprise Performance and the Impact of Pay Ceiling Drder——An Empirical Study on the 133 A Share State-owned Holding Listed Companies

作　　者：陶萍[1] 张睿[1] 朱佳[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150006

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2016年第6期17-29,79,共14页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：高管薪酬不仅包括货币薪酬,还包括高管持股与在职消费。本文以2007年以前上市的133家A股国有控股公司为研究对象,选择2007-2014年年报相关变量数据为研究样本,分别检验国有控股公司高管薪酬对企业绩效的激励效应、高管薪酬激励效应在中央政府控股公司和地方政府控股公司间的差异以及高管薪酬激励效应在"限薪令"政策颁布前后的差异。研究发现:国有控股公司高管货币薪酬对企业绩效有显著正激励效应,高管持股有不显著正激励效应,高管在职消费有不显著负激励效应;中央控股公司高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的正激励效应显著高于地方控股公司,地方控股公司高管在职消费对企业绩效的负激励效应显著更高;"限薪令"颁布后高管货币薪酬正激励效应显著高于"限薪令"颁布前,"限薪令"颁布后高管在职消费对企业绩效为不显著的正向激励。This paper adopts the generalized concept not only including monetary compensation,but also the executive＇s shareholding and on-the-job consumption. Based on the 133 A share state-owned holding listed companies, and choosing the data from 2007 to 2014, we verify the impacts ofexecutive compensation incentive, the different influences between central holdings and local hold-ings, and the different effects before and after the ＂pay ceiling order＂. The results displayed that：Executives monetary compensation has significantly positive effect on enterprise achievement, andexecutives shareholding has not significantly active impact on business results. On-the-job con-sumption also has not significantly negative incentive influence on corporate performance. The cen-tral holdings companies executives monetary compensation has higher significantly positive effecton enterprise achievement than local holdings, and the local holdings companies on-the-job con-sumption has higher significantly negative effect on enterprise achievement than central holdings.After the issue of the ＂pay ceiling order＂, the positive incentive influence of monetary compensationis higher than before, and the positive incentive impact of on-the-job consumption is not significant.

关 键 词：国有控股 高管薪酬 企业绩效 最终控制人性质 限薪令 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]