高管薪酬、实际控制人持股水平与企业业绩  

Executive Compensation, Actual Controller Shareholding Stakes and Corporate Performance

作　　者：吴国鼎[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所,北京100732

出　　处：《辽宁大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第4期50-62,共13页Journal of Liaoning University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71202030);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC630287)

摘　　要：通过对高管薪酬、实际控制人持股水平对企业业绩影响的考察,总体来看,高管薪酬对企业业绩有正向影响,而且这种正向影响程度随着企业实际控制人持股比例的增加而增大。和非竞争性行业相比,竞争性行业中企业实际控制人持股比例越大,高管薪酬对企业业绩的正向影响程度也越大。和国有企业比较,民营企业中的实际控制人持股比例越大,高管薪酬对企业业绩的正向影响程度也越大。比较中央国有企业和地方国有企业,则高管薪酬与企业业绩的这种正向关系在地方国有企业中更加显著。In this paper, we investigate the influence of the executive compensation and the proportion of the actual controller on the performance of the enterprise. This paper shows that, in general, the greater the proportion of the actual controller, the greater the positive impact of executive compensation on corporate performance. Compared with non-competitive industries, the greater the proportion of the actual control of the company in the competitive industry, the greater the positive impact of executive compensation on corporate performance. Compared with state-owned enterprises, the greater the proportion of the actual control of private enterprises, the greater the impact of executive compensation on corporate performance. Compared with the central state-owned enterprises, the greater the proportion of the actual control of the local state-owned enterprises, the higher the positive impact of executive compensation on corporate performance.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 企业业绩 实际控制人 行业竞争性 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]