冯友兰“新理学”若干问题刍议  

On Several Issues in Feng You-lan's “New Rational Philosophy”

作　　者：李承贵[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学研究》2016年第8期41-50,128,共10页Philosophical Research

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目"20世纪中国传统哲学与马克思主义哲学;西方哲学关系的历史考察"(编号13AZD021)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：冯友兰"新理学"的建构,受到了一些同行的质疑与批评,这些质疑与批评主要表现为两点:一是"新理学"方法与宋明理学不适应;二是"新理学"的本体空虚不实。不过,客观而深入地理解"新理学"之后的判断应该是:"新理学"方法并不必然地伤害宋明理学,而"新理学"的本体更非"空"所能涵盖。事实是,"新理学"的建构不仅显示了冯友兰缜密的思辩力,也说明其对中国哲学、宋明理学的精准把握,更透显出开辟中国哲学新方向的期许与努力。而"新理学"学术层面的价值尤为值得学界珍视:它既是中国哲学在形态上的有益尝试,也有经典诠释方法上的独特示范,更是哲学回应现实课题与表达生命关怀的独特路径。The construction of Feng You-lan's 'New Rational Philosophy'has faced many questions and criticisms from his academic peers. These largely reduce to two charges: first,that Feng's philosophy is not consistent with Neo-Confucianism,and second,that its ontology is unreliable. If we scrutinize Feng's philosophy thoroughly,it becomes clear that Feng's philosophy does not clash with Neo-Confucianism,and that its ontology should not be interpreted as 'unreliable'. In fact,Feng's philosophy not only shows the rigor of his thinking,but also reveals his attempts to open up a new direction for Chinese philosophy.

关 键 词：冯友兰 新理学 新实在论 

分 类 号：B261[哲学宗教—中国哲学]