价值实践本位:道德形而上的剥离与其现实性的介入  

Value's Practice Standard:Theory of Moral with Metaphysical Stripping and Its Reality

作　　者：金颜[1] 

机构地区：[1]青海师范大学马克思主义学院,青海西宁810008

出　　处：《南昌大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2016年第5期37-41,共5页Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"市场经济条件下社会道德建设研究"(12CKS038)

摘　　要：道德是主体在"义务利他"前提下"自在自为"的选择,至高准则是"至善",这是道德形而上剥离后的价值判断。但是,道德的规定性不应仅存于理性范畴,其价值的合理性意义更在于社会实践功能的合法化逻辑。只有排除道德价值实践的现实障碍,将道德的价值理性融入社会关系当中,渗透于由道德意识、道德活动和道德关系构成的社会道德体系,实现其在社会现实生活中的价值本位作用,方能实现道德理想与社会现实的统一,体现道德对人类的终极关怀。Morality is the natural choice of the subject on the premise of＂compulsory altruism＂while the highest criterion is ＂good＂. This is the value judgment of moral after metaphysical stripping. Moral＇s significance lies not only in the rational category but also in the social practice even more. Only by excluding the real obstacles to the practice of moral value and blending the rationality of moral value into the social relations permeating the social moral system which made up of moral awareness,moral activities and moral relations,realizing its value standard role in the social reality,can we achieve the unity of moral ideal and social reality while reflecting the morality of human ultimate concern.

关 键 词：道德 形而上学 价值实践 现实性 

分 类 号：B82-052[哲学宗教—伦理学]