超越规则的边界?——比较视角下中国集体谈判结构变化背后的权力关系  

Beyond the Boundary of Regulations?——Power Relationship Behind the Changing Structure of Collective Bargaining in China

作　　者：孟泉[1] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学劳动经济学院

出　　处：《中国人力资源开发》2016年第20期84-93,共10页Human Resources Development of China

基　　金：首都经济贸易大学特别委托项目"工业园集体劳动争议的发生;演化与预防机制研究"资助

摘　　要：中国情境下的集体谈判在出现罢工的情况下,可以成为具有化解与预防罢工功能的工具性博弈机制。本文通过对比D区与G省两个典型案例的分析发现,集体谈判结构变化实际上受到了工人罢工与地方政府政治空间开放双重因素的推动,但同时又受到地方政府管控与工人经济性诉求双重因素的局限。因此,其效果既实现工人工资的增长,也同时将罢工工人自发形成的集体力量嵌入并约束在制度化的轨道上。而工会作为中间的调节组织推动了这种约束的形成。本文认为,谈判结构变化背后的权力关系变化暗示出在地方政府与工会对集体谈判间接或直接的介入下,工资集体协商机制很难发展成为劳资自主形式的集体谈判。然而,工会作为调节组织其有效性将决定这类集体谈判机制再生产出工人的"同意"抑或"反抗"。In the context of China, to tackle strike issues, collective bargaining can be regarded as an instrumental mechanism which serves to resolve and prevent the strike. By comparative study on two typical cases, namely D District and G Province, the paper found that the change of bargaining structure was impacted by dual elements, including both workers＇ strike and the openness of political space of the regional government. However, the change was also constrained by the government control and workers＇ economic pursuit. Therefore, the dual effects of collective bargaining include wage increase and embedding workers＇ collective power into an institutionalized route. Trade union, as the mediating organization, promoted the limitation. Arguably, the change of power relationship behind the shift of bargaining structure implies that the wage collective consultation can hardly become automatic collective bargaining between the employer and workers with the direct or indirect intervention of the regional government and the trade union. However, the effectiveness of the trade union as a mediating organization results in reproduction of consent or resistance via this sort of collective bargaining.

关 键 词：集体谈判 谈判结构 权力关系变化 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]