约翰·格雷的“权宜之计”及其局限  

John Gray's “Modus Vivendi” and Its Limitations

作　　者：孙旭鹏[1] 王樱霖[2] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学人文学院,江苏南京211189 [2]上饶师范学院政法学院,江西上饶334001

出　　处：《华中科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第6期88-93,共6页Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目"中国古代谏议制的儒家思想基础研究"(13BZX047)

摘　　要：约翰·格雷作为一位自由主义思想家,他一方面梳理了自由主义的发展脉络,另一方面也察觉到自由主义在解决现代性问题时的困局。约翰·格雷认为自由主义内部始终存在着两种面孔,一种充满着对理性共识的追求,另一种则主张多元价值的共存。约翰·格雷站在后者的立场,他认为追求"理性共识"的自由主义已经无法解决现代性难题,只有顺应价值多元的现实采取一种后自由主义的"权宜之计",才是自由主义未来的正确出路。然而,约翰·格雷以"权宜之计"为核心的后自由主义设计存在着无法避免的局限:"权宜之计"由于过分强调价值多元,极容易滑向价值相对主义的泥潭,从而使这一理论根本无法有效地解决价值冲突。As a liberal thinker,John Gray on the one hand,has combed the development context of liberalism,and found the dilemma on solving the problem of modernity of liberalism on the other. He thinks that liberalism always has two faces,one full of the pursuit of rational consensus,the other on the coexistence of multiple values. Standing in the latter position,John Gray thinks that the rational consensus liberalism has been unable to solve the problems of modernity. Only ＂modus vivendi＂of post-liberal following multiple values is the right future way of liberalism. However,there are unavoidable limitations in John Gray＇s post-liberal ＂modus vivendi＂： ＂modus vivendi＂focuses on multiple values too much,and it has risk to slide into relativism mire,so this theory can not effectively solve the conflicts of different values.

关 键 词：约翰·格雷 权宜之计 后自由主义 局限性 

分 类 号：B712.6[哲学宗教—外国哲学]