从当代道德心理学的视角看孟子的恻隐之心  

Mencius's Compassion from the Perspective of Contemporary Moral Psychology

作　　者：蔡蓁[1] 赵研妍 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系 [2]福建省社会科学院哲学所

出　　处：《社会科学》2016年第12期121-127,共7页Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"进化论伦理学前沿问题研究"(项目编号:15BZX097);国家社会科学基金重大项目"基于虚拟现实的实验研究对实验哲学的超越"(项目编号:15ZDB016)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：孟子的恻隐之心概念日益受到西方哲学家和心理学家的关注。运用当代道德心理学的概念资源可以发现,恻隐之心作为人性中最首要的善之端,既包括对他人痛苦感到移情式的不安,也包括对他人的福祉怀有同情式的关切。对孟子恻隐之心的这种解读也有助于澄清孟子和他在进化生物学领域中的当代支持者之间究竟存在哪些共鸣和差异,以及孟子的理论可能面临的挑战。Mencius＇s concept of compassion has gained increasing attention from both philosophers and psychologists in the west. From the perspective of contemporary moral psychology, Mencius＇s compassion, as the first ethical sprout in human nature, encompasses both empathic distress of others＇ suffering and sympathetic concern of others＇ well-being. This interpretation of Mencius＇s compassion also helps to illustrate the resonance and the divergence between Mencius and his contemporary supporter in evolutionary biology circle, as well as the possible challenges posed against Mencius＇s moral theory.

关 键 词：道德心理学 恻隐之心 移情 同情 

分 类 号：B222.5[哲学宗教—中国哲学] B82