企业社会责任与高管薪酬辩护  

Corporate Social Responsibility and Executive Compensation Defense

作　　者：吉利[1] 吴萌[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第6期116-125,共10页Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"制度环境;战略性企业社会责任与其行为后果:基于权变理论视角的整合研究"(71302184);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"企业社会责任信息披露印象管理研究"(13YJC790054);财政部"全国会计领军(后备)人才培养项目";中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目"机构投资者关注下的CSRD与股权资本成本的关系研究"(JBK1407115)

摘　　要：随着社会责任意识的普及,企业社会责任已成为企业战略发展的重要组成部分。采用2009—2013年发布企业社会责任报告的上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了企业社会责任对高管薪酬的影响;并且基于薪酬辩护假说,进一步检验内部收入差距、高管权力等对企业社会责任与高管薪酬关系的影响。研究结果显示,企业社会责任是高管绩效考核的重要的非财务指标,企业社会责任增加高管薪酬。当企业内部收入差距较大时,高管可能通过增加薪酬契约中社会责任指标权重的方式进行薪酬辩护,并且相较于非国有企业,国有企业高管的薪酬辩护行为更明显。管理层权力影响高管的薪酬辩护行为,相较于权力较小的高管,权力较大的高管更可能通过增加社会责任业绩指标权重的方式进行薪酬辩护。Using a sample of A- share listed companies from the period of 2009- 2013,we empirically examine the effects of corporate social responsibility（ CSR） on executive compensation. Based on the pay defense hypothesis,we further examine the effects of the internal pay gap and managerial power on the relationship between CSR and executive compensation. The results show that CSR is an important non-financial indicator of executive performance evaluation and tends to lead to higher executive compensation. Also,when the internal income gap is wider,executives have stronger incentives to defend themselves for their high pay and put more weight on CSR in their compensation agreements. The pressure to defend increases and defense behavior becomes more obvious in state-owned companies and in companies where managers enjoy greater power. Our study not only provides new evidence for pay defense,but also enriches the research on the motivation of CSR.

关 键 词：企业社会责任 高管薪酬 薪酬辩护 内部收入差距 管理层权力 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]