销售努力为私人信息情况下的激励机制研究  

A Study of Incentive Mechanism Model with Sales Effort as Private Information

作　　者：张晨星[1] 谢铁军[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学数理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《海南师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2016年第3期249-255,共7页Journal of Hainan Normal University（Natural Science）

摘　　要：文章研究市场中一个由单个供货商和单个销售商构成的供应链,市场需求是线性的,与销售商的销售努力和销售价格有关.在得到完全信息情况下的供货商和销售商的收益函数表达式及价格表达式之后,研究了不完全信息情况下供货商激励机制的设计,建立了激励机制的泛函极值模型,并求出了模型的解析解.最后,用MATLAB进行数值分析,结果表明该激励机制对收益有优化效果.The research is to study a supply chain which consists of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Market demand is linear, influenced by both price and sales efforts. After obtaining the expressions of the profit and price for the supplier and the retailer under symmetric information, we study the designed problem of the incentive mechanism for the supplier under asymmetric information. The functional extremum model for the incentive mechanism is established and the analytic solution is obtained. Finally, numerical analysis is performed with MATLAB. The result shows that the incentive mechanism can increase the profits.

关 键 词：信息不对称 激励机制 供应链 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]