民营企业经营者的股东权力关联及其绩效影响研究  

Study on Managers' Power Connection with Shareholders and Its Performance Influence in Private Firms

作　　者：王新霞[1] 柳春[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安外国语大学经济金融学院,陕西西安710128 [2]西安交通大学金禾经济研究中心,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2016年第5期106-113,共8页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：以实际控制人为逻辑起点,本文理论剖析了民营企业经营者的股东权力关联及其绩效影响,并探讨了薪酬激励对其绩效影响的调节作用。实证检验发现:(1)在两职合一民营企业中,经营者的股东权力关联对企业绩效不存在显著影响;(2)在两职分设民营企业中,董事长的股东权力关联有利于改善企业绩效,而总经理的股东权力关联对企业绩效不存在显著影响或产生不利影响;(3)薪酬激励有助于强化经营者股东权力关联的积极影响,抑制其消极影响。Taking the actual controller as logical starting point,this paper theoretically analyzed managers' power connection with shareholders and its performance influence in private firms,and discussed the moderating effect of compensation incentive on the performance influence. The empirical tests found that:( 1)Managers' power connection with shareholders has no significant influence on performance in firms with two posts syncretic;( 2) In firms with two posts respective,chairman's power connection with shareholders helps to improve firm performance while CEO's power connection with shareholders has no significant or adverse impact on firm performance;( 3) Compensation incentive is helpful to strengthen the positive influence of managers' power connection with shareholders and restrain its negative influence.

关 键 词：经营者 股东权力关联 薪酬激励 绩效影响 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F272.92